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1. Overview  
Federalism is an organising principle according to which a political community or alliance is divided into 
constituent political units, which are afforded substantial autonomy and contribute to shaping the will of 
the higher political authority. In most federal systems, municipalities are integrated units or members of 
the state governments. Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and Switzerland are countries that have adopted a 
relatively unusual three-tier federal structure in which exclusive legislative powers are granted to the 
local government level, below state and provincial government.1  
Decentralisation brings services closer to the average person and has the potential to increase citizen 
participation in prioritising services and the way they are delivered. In principle, this has the potential to 
improve overall accountability and give greater voice to the users of services, including the poor and 
vulnerable. However, having three spheres of government operating with a degree of autonomy makes 
for complex relationships that may impact negatively on the effectiveness and efficiency of government. 
Moreover, whilst the idea of devolving powers to the lowest possible level is attractive in principle, it is 
only likely to lead to improved outcomes if the lowest level has the capacity and competence to assume 
those powers. 
This rapid review synthesises findings from academic, practitioner, and policy literature. Whilst there is a 
large body of literature that analyses various aspects of federalism, authors seldom focus on the 
experience of countries which have implemented this particular three-tier structure. Those studies that 
do address this area tend to be found either in peer-reviewed academic journals or as part of edited 
collections published by large international development organisations. The literature surveyed for this 
report did not incorporate gender concerns.  
Key findings 
 The central government in Argentina has encountered difficulties in implementing social policy 
through national-local policy collaboration due to low levels of constitutional autonomy and 
decision-making authority at the municipal level.   
 By contrast, the successful experience of social protection programmes in Brazil indicates that 
municipalities can facilitate the social policy goals established by central government provided 
national policies are implemented directly at the municipal level, without being captured by 
state governors.  
 In South Africa, many municipalities have been compelled to take on complex responsibilities 
despite lacking the technical and administrative competence to discharge them successfully. As a 
result, the country has experienced a failure of policy and an erosion of good governance at local 
government level. 
 In Switzerland, the complexity of the relations between the provincial and municipal levels of 
government have been considered non-transparent and inefficient, and have led to various 
reform initiatives designed to promote greater co-operation. 
                                               
1
 This is not an exhaustive list of countries with this federal structure, but rather represents the examples that were found 
during a rapid review of recent evidence. For the purpose of this review, ‘local government’ refers to the lowest level of 
government in the three-tier structure, and this is used interchangeably with ‘municipal government’.  
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2. Country profiles 
Argentina  
Federal structure 
Argentina is a federal country divided into 23 states and one autonomous city, Buenos Aires. These 
autonomous states are divided into 2218 autonomous municipalities, with the exception of Buenos Aires 
which is divided into 15 communes subdivided into 48 neighborhoods (OECD 2016). 
Argentine local governments, in their executive and legislative branches, are made up of elected officers. 
Mayors and councilors are appointed through free elections held autonomously or coinciding with 
provincial or national elections (Asensio 2006).  
The legal status and autonomy of Argentine municipalities are secured through provincial constitutions. 
Therefore the effective autonomy of municipalities depends on the scope granted to them by their 
corresponding province. Municipalities are subject to intervention from provincial governments if they do 
not properly carry out their duties. This intervention can entail removing authorities from office and 
replacing them with others appointed provisionally by a higher level of government (Ibid).  
Municipalities are financed through their own taxes, through transfers from other government levels, and 
through credit (Ibid).  
Division of powers and responsibilities 
The provinces have political, judicial, administrative and financial autonomy. According to the 1994 
Federal Constitution of Argentina, provinces can establish their own constitutions and laws, and they 
have the power to elect their authorities and organise their own administrations of justice. The provinces 
can create regions for socio-economic development, and can also enter into international agreements, 
provided they do not conflict with national foreign policy. The provinces also manage the natural 
resources in their territories and may be responsible for secondary education (Asensio 2006).  
Municipalities are essentially self-governed. This self-government includes an assembly, an executive, and 
courts that rule on misdemeanors or minor infractions that affect urban coexistence (Ibid). Municipalities 
have both exclusive and shared competences. Their exclusive powers include waste management, 
markets and cemeteries, public transportation and the construction and regulation of public roads. They 
also share responsibility for primary education, primary health care, water and sewerage, regional roads 
construction and maintenance with provinces.  Some major municipalities have de facto responsibility for 
health care services and the maintenance of school buildings (OECD 2016). However, ultimately the 
definition and rules regulating municipalities (including the extent of their  autonomy, borrowing 
capacity, and the percentage of provincial resources they receive) are decided by each province’s 
constitution (Fenwick 2010).  
Issues and lessons 
Municipal autonomy and social policy. Although they enjoy certain exclusive competences, 
municipalities in Argentina have relatively limited powers in comparison to other countries with three-
tier federal systems. According to Fenwick (2010), the low level of constitutional autonomy and decision-
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making authority at the municipal level is directly responsible for the fact that Argentina has achieved 
less social policy success through national-local policy collaboration than other federal countries (notably 
Brazil, which is discussed below). As noted above, municipalities depend on formal recognition from 
provinces for their status as an official third tier of government. This means that federal politics in 
Argentina is predominately played out between central and provincial levels of government. These 
dynamics are highly politicised due to Argentina’s majoritarian political dynamics, which have 
traditionally been dominated by two parties (Ibid: 167). The figureheads for public policy-making in 
Argentina are provincial governors, who are responsible for providing the majority of public social goods. 
Governors can block national social policy goals and prevent municipalities from exercising their own 
agency. Equally, national elites do not always have sufficient political incentive to try to impose policy at 
the sub-national level, partly because of the institutional requirement in Argentina to achieve single-party 
majorities (Ibid: 168).  
Fenwick (2010) argues that these political and institutional dynamics restrict the ability of the national 
government to successfully implement social protection programmes, and dis-incentivise municipalities 
to implement social policy initiatives in a uniform manner throughout the country. It was intended that 
Programa Familias - Argentina’s national social protection initiative - would bypass provincial 
intermediation, to reduce the risk that it would be subject to political manipulation. However, according 
to Fenwick (2010), in practice the majoritarian nature of Argentina’s political system has impeded the 
national policy goal at the heart of the programme. According to conventional electoral logic, it makes 
little sense for local governments to participate in the implementation of a national programme if they 
are not aligned through partisanship with the ruling national elites. In the Argentine case, municipal 
mayors therefore have little incentive to carry out policies in collaboration with the national government, 
unless it is supported by their provincial government (Ibid).  
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that mayors cannot personally claim credit for the successful 
implementation of the programme within their territory. Within the design of Familias, “municipalities 
just sit back and watch.”2 In many cases this impedes their willingness to co-operate with the 
programme’s implementation – a problem which is deepened by the fact that, in the context of 
Argentina’s party-centred political dynamics, majors are generally more concerned with seeking office 
than pursuing public policy (Ibid). Low levels of municipal autonomy within the context of majoritarian 
political dynamics does not provide mayors with an incentive to provide constituency services in order to 
forge their careers - but does provide them with an incentive to use patronage to develop patronage 
networks. As a result of these dynamics, inconsistent implementation has been the main policy challenge 
for the success of poverty alleviation programs in Argentina (Ibid).  
Brazil 
Federal structure 
The Brazilian constitution of 1988 established municipal government as a third tier of government. 
Municipalities were given the same status as members of the federation as the intermediate 
government, sharing the same rights and duties of states. All Brazilian municipal governments enjoy the 
                                               
2
 Information obtained from an interview with the ex-director of social development, Municipality of La Matanza. 
September 29, 2006 [San Justo]; cited in Fenwick (2010: 174). 
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same legal status (Alfonso and Araujo 2006). Although politically autonomous, local governments still 
largely depend on the federal government for financial support (Ribeiro and Pinto 2009). 
Every municipal government holds its own elections. The mayor and the municipal council members are 
selected directly by the voters for a four-year term. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters, a 
second-run election must be held if no candidate achieves a majority. As in the national and state 
legislative body, municipal councilors are elected through a system of open-list proportional 
representation. The number of councilors varies according to the municipality’s population (Alfonso and 
Araujo 2006). 
States are entirely divided into municipalities. The number of municipalities varies from 15 in the 
northern state of Roraima to 853 in Southeastern Minas Gerais. Municipalities also vary widely in size of 
population, from the smallest, Nova Castilho (close to 1,000 people), to the largest, São Paulo (10.9 
million people) (Ribeiro and Pinto 2009).  
Division of powers and responsibilities  
After the promulgation of the 1988 constitution, each municipality became entitled to issue its own 
constitution, known as organic law. An organic law must be voted for and approved by two-thirds of the 
councillors. The right to self-organisation is the most important legal feature of municipal status. This 
right prohibits states from interfering in the direct organisation of municipalities. Municipalities are 
constituent units, deriving both their legal and operational competences directly from the federal 
Constitution. The political autonomy of municipalities, therefore, is legally asserted. States cannot compel 
or prohibit actions by municipalities within their jurisdictions (Alfonso and Araujo 2006).   
Among other principles, the Constitution includes the right of residents to elect their local municipal 
officials – the mayor, the deputy mayor, and the councillors – without interference from the federal or 
state governments. Municipal autonomy entails legislating on matters of local interest (e.g., land use) and 
deciding how to provide public services, organise territory, and use municipal financial resources. 
Exclusive competences include the collection of local taxes, the provision of local services directly or 
under concession/permission, including collective transportation in inner cities and setting directives for, 
and inspection of, land use (Ribeiro and Pinto 2009) 
Functions which are exclusive to the federal government include defense, foreign affairs, environmental 
management, and labor. Responsibility for social insurance and energy are also concentrated at the 
federal tier. Public security is a state function, whereas housing and urbanisation are municipal. The three 
tiers of government share responsibilities for education, health and sanitation (Alfonso and Araujo 2006).  
The municipalities enjoy broad autonomy in regard to levying taxes and collecting other forms of income, 
making expenditures, and hiring public employees, setting their salaries, and contracting debts. The 
budgets and corresponding rendering of accounts are submitted to the legislative powers of the local 
governments themselves and do not depend on authorisation or evaluation by the federal government. 
Local governments have a reasonable amount of leeway with regard to larger transfers from central and 
state governments connected with fundamental education and public health programs, which operate as 
general-purpose grants (Alfonso and Araujo 2006).  
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Issues and lessons 
Uniform, strong municipal autonomy. Some authors are critical of the fact that all municipalities in Brazil 
have the same status as political and administrative units and thus are given symmetric treatment in 
respect of their rights and duties, regardless of inequality in their economic and technical capabilities 
(Ribeiro and Pinto 2009).  
Another criticism of the Brazilian model of strong municipal autonomy centres on the reduction of the co-
ordinating function of the state authorities. It is suggested that if states lack the necessary instruments to 
coordinate action within their territory this may result in perverse outcomes, especially in metropolitan 
regions where the impact of the decisions of one municipality cannot always be contained within its 
jurisdictional boundaries. Without the effective means to enforce coordination, a state government 
cannot prevent conflicting and overlapping policies from arising between municipalities and between 
municipalities and the state (Ibid). 
Municipal autonomy and social policy. Brazil’s decentralised form of governance has provided 
opportunities for local governments to experiment with social policies (Sugiyama 2011: 25). Since 1995, 
locally designed anti-poverty programmes and primary health and basic education initiatives have been 
nationalised in Brazil, but rely on municipal implementation. Drawing a direct contrast with the 
experience of social assistance programmes in Argentina (discussed above), Fenwick (2010) asserts that 
central-local collaboration has been key to enabling the federal government to achieve its target of 
providing cash transfers to more than 11 million vulnerable families federation-wide, in fewer than three 
years (2003–2006).  
Fenwick (2010) suggests that direct national-local collaboration has enabled the Brazilian government to 
bypass governors and spread non-contributory welfare goods evenly across its territory. Brazil has a 
highly fragmented and weak party system. In this context, sub-national political elites have an electoral 
incentive to pursue social policy goals, making national-local policy collaboration politically feasible as 
part of a ‘race to the top’. Fenwick’s broader conclusion is that municipalities can facilitate the ability of 
the central government to achieve its policy goals, particularly in social arenas. But for this to occur, 
national policies must be directly implemented at the municipal level, without being captured at the 
intermediate level by powerful state-based governors. 
Fenwick (2010) highlights three institutional factors that provide incentives for successful central-local 
collaboration with regard to social policy in Brazil: the constitutional autonomy of municipalities, a non-
majoritarian political system, and the gradual hardening of sub-national budget constraints.  
Constitutionally autonomous municipalities: The provision of basic health services and primary 
education in Brazil falls primarily under the jurisdiction of municipalities. In the Bolsa Familia programme, 
municipalities are also responsible for providing and coordinating the required public services already 
under their jurisdiction, for registering the targeted low-income families in their territory, and for 
establishing agreements between non-governmental organisations and various local bodies to provide 
social control for the programme. Within Bolsa Familia’s organisation, municipal governments act as the 
primary agents of the federal government. In the highly decentralised federal structure of government, 
states have veto power and municipalities have policy opt-out privileges. Municipalities had little to lose 
by participating and supporting Bolsa Familia, given that their main responsibility is to be the federation’s 
primary social service provider and that, after 2000, this responsibility was legally enforceable through 
fiscal regulation imposed by the federal government.  
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Non-majoritarian political system: In the Brazilian political institutional context, mayors have an 
incentive to support nationally driven social programmes such as Bolsa Familia. They participated in 
implementing it regardless of their partisan affinity to the federal centre and were able to claim some 
political credit for themselves, while also stimulating their local economy with small cash inflows. A mass 
poverty-alleviation programme such as Bolsa Familia is a win-win situation for key actors at both the 
central and the local level. The federal government’s ability to govern in Brazil depends on its ability to 
forge broad governing coalitions both within the national legislature and across levels of executive 
government. The logic of coalition governance means that the ideological or party-based ownership of 
policy ideas is less significant. This decreases the incentives of locally-based actors to withhold co-
operation or to spoil the implementation of national programmes for fear of party-based punishment 
from upper levels of their party (Fenwick 2009: 119).  
Moreover, state-based power brokers make it difficult for the President to claim credit for targeted 
expenditures that go through the states, and they have few partisan incentives to facilitate the delivery of 
public goods federation-wide in the name of common interest (Rodden and Arretche 2004). Therefore, 
there is a political incentive for the central government to bypass intermediate levels of government and 
deliver broad national goods, such as Bolsa Familia, for which it can claim credit. This is particularly 
important in Brazil, where the non-majoritarian political system ensures that all votes matter in all 
territories for the President’s success (Ibid: 11). In federal systems such as Mexico and Argentina, where 
majority-based parties tend to dominate the sub-national level, it is not in the interest of the central 
government to bypass bureaucratic implementing agencies at the state level (Fenwick 2009: 120). 
Brazil’s open-list electoral rules provide further incentives for politicians to favour local and regional 
demands in social policy. In this system, the political survival of state-based federal deputies and 
governors depends on their ability to claim credit for successful policy outcomes. Those states which are 
not involved in the implementation of federal poverty-alleviation initiatives lose the opportunity to claim 
political credit for them. This is a significant cost in a political context in which individualism and 
personalism are important aspects of sub-national election campaigns (Ibid: 117).  
Hard budget constraints exist when sub-national levels of government do not receive outside support to 
cover excessive spending, and have to terminate spending activities if a deficit persists. According to 
Fenwick (2010: 161), this approach weakens the interdependent relationship between provincial and 
local levels of government, and provides a fiscal incentive for sub-national government to implement 
nationally-financed public policy.  
In Brazil, the hardening of budget constraints put in place under the central administration to stabilise 
macroeconomic performance gave municipalities a new incentive to collaborate with the central 
government, in order to increase their share of the central government’s earmarked grants (Fenwick 
2009: 117). Their collaboration with the federal government also enabled them to meet the one per cent 
they are legally required to spend on social assistance. As one municipal-level technical adviser in a large 
city claimed, “Bolsa Familia allows us to work our fiscal accounts — although the money does not go 
through them, the total amount transferred into our territory is included on our balance sheets.”3 The 
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 Interview with senior technical assistant (name withheld), Municipal Secretary of Social Assistance and Social 
Development, Sao Paolo (February 10, 2006); cited in Fenwick (2009: 117).  
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broader proposition is that national-local policy collaboration is fiscally encouraged through regulating 
responsibility for public policy spending and setting sub-national budget targets (Fenwick 2010: 157). 
South Africa 
Federal structure 
Municipal government in South Africa is constitutionally recognised along with provincial and national 
government, and has an entrenched, though limited, degree of autonomy. South African local 
government has been given a critical developmental role to play in rebuilding local communities and 
environments as the basis for a democratic, integrated, prosperous and non-racial society.  
231 local municipalities form the basic local government institution. They vary considerably in size and 
significance: the smallest has a population of 6,844 residents and covers a vast expanse of desert, while 
the largest municipalities – Buffalo City (East London), Msunduzi (Pietermaritzburg) and Mangaung 
(Bloemfontein) – are provincial capitals and have declared themselves aspiring metros (Steytler 2005). 
Division of powers and responsibilities 
Local government is referred to in the South African Constitution as one of the three spheres of 
government which are distinct, interdependent and interrelated, and it is afforded the right to govern the 
local affairs of its community. To that end, it is given constitutionally recognised and protected powers, 
and the national and provincial governments are prohibited from exercising undue interference.  
The Constitution establishes a principle of subsidiarity according to which national and provincial 
functions that are more effectively exercised by municipalities should be assigned to local government. 
National and provincial functions can be transferred to local government in general or to individual 
municipalities, thereby creating the possibility for asymmetrical development of municipalities. 
Municipalities enjoy constitutionally guaranteed taxing powers as well as an equitable share of 
nationally-generated revenue (de Visser, 2009). 
Issues and lessons 
The competence and autonomy of municipalities. Some authors have argued that the burdens placed on 
South African local government are too great for many municipalities to cope with, particularly given the 
lack of technocratic skills in the country in general (de Visser 2009; Steytler 2005; Siddle and Koelble 
2016). The legal and constitutional recognition of local government in South Africa propels it to a status 
that at times equals or surpasses that of provincial government. However, in reality many municipalities 
are incapable of asserting their financial and political autonomy (de Visser, 2009). This is partly because 
the size and shape of municipalities varies enormously, ranging from mega-city metros with budgets that 
exceed those of some provinces, to small, rural, impoverished local municipalities. Yet, formally, a 
symmetrical legal regime applies to all municipalities. This places a strain on the poorly resourced and 
skilled municipalities to comply with the rigours of that regime, as well as to exploit the legal space for 
local self-government. In consequence, the country has experienced a failure of policy and an erosion of 
good governance at local government level (Steytler 2005; Siddle and Koelble 2016).  
A further issue raised in the literature concerns the manner in which policy decisions at the national level 
affect municipal autonomy. According to Steytler (2005), municipalities are increasingly required to 
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implement national policies in ways that impact directly on their financial status. For example, after the 
2000 election it became government policy that municipalities had to subsidise a basic level of water and 
electricity for poor households. Although the policy directive has been followed by increased transfers 
from the national treasury, municipalities have to subsidise part of the cost from their own resources. 
This can have major implications for municipalities’ financial viability, particularly in rural areas (Steytler 
2005).  
The developmental mandate of local government. According to de Visser (2009), local governments do 
not have all the powers which are needed to carry out the developmental mandate that has been 
assigned to them in the Constitution. For example, housing is a shared provincial and national 
competency, despite the fact that it is a key aspect of development. De Visser (2009) maintains that, in 
practice, municipalities are the key implementing agents of the housing function, but they perform this 
function at the behest of provinces, without having any significant policy or fiscal autonomy to make 
localised decisions. This leads to scenarios in which political tensions can come to the fore, particularly 
where a municipality and its province are controlled by different political parties (de Visser 2009). 
Capacity shortfall. Inappropriate recruitment practices, political interference, and inadequate support 
from senior governments all contribute to a capacity shortfall which is experienced in South African local 
government. This lack of capacity (ranging from technical, administrative to financial skills) is particularly 
problematic given the highly complex range of tasks which are imposed on local authorities (Siddle and 
Koelble 2016). 
Lack of accountability. The devolution of power to local government must be accompanied by effective 
mechanisms of accountability, anti-corruption, and transparency in order to lead to good governance. 
However, according to Siddle and Koelble (2016), transparent decision-making, financial and 
administrative accountability, local leadership and the engagement of communities is absent in many of 
South Africa’s municipalities. Public participation mechanisms are poorly applied, and many appointed or 
elected officials do not view themselves as accountable to the electorate or the local population.  
Switzerland 
Federal structure  
Switzerland is divided into 26 cantons and 2,815 municipalities. The size of the cantons and the number 
of municipalities within a canton, as well as the size of the municipalities within and between cantons, 
varies considerably. Municipalities are under cantonal supervision, although cantons and municipalities 
have their own political institutions. Each canton and municipality has an executive, which is usually 
directly elected by the citizens. As with the federal government, almost all executive bodies combine 
members from different parties. Cantons and larger municipalities have an elected legislature, and 
cantons as well as municipalities employ various forms of direct democracy. There are two city cantons 
(Basle-City and Geneva) with almost no autonomous municipalities, and there are mountain cantons (e.g. 
Graubünden) with strong autonomy of municipalities (Ladner 2009).  
The implementation of federal policies is left to cantons and municipalities, with the cantons acting as 
intermediaries between the confederation and the municipalities (Ibid). 
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At the municipal level, the executive power is called the municipal council and is in most cases a collegial 
body elected by citizens. As a rule it consists of five to ten members. The supreme organ of the 
municipality is either the assembly of all citizens or a communal parliament (Bulliard 2005). 
Division of powers and responsibilities 
The Swiss federal system operates under the principle of subsidiarity according to which all activities not 
explicitly assigned to higher political levels remain within the scope of lower-level authorities. Higher 
levels should thus take over powers of the lower level only when the lower level is not able to assume its 
responsibilities.  
Within the limitations established by federal law, each canton can decide on the organisation and 
political structure of their territory. They can limit their own cantonal powers or they can delegate some 
of these powers to municipalities. Municipalities’ autonomous and non-autonomous tasks are assigned 
by states and thus differ from one state to another. They typically include education (pre, primary and 
secondary schools), health and social welfare, water, electricity, and traffic, local roads, land use 
planning, natural resource management, recreation and culture, municipal police, etc (OECD 2016). Given 
their size differences not all municipalities can fulfil the same mandate (Ladner 2009). 
Local government is supervised by the canton. The extent of cantonal supervision depends on the legal 
framework that is given to the municipalities, the size of the municipalities, and the strength of the 
canton itself. In areas that fall within the competence of the municipalities, supervision is restricted to 
the lawfulness of the municipalities’ activities; in areas that do not fall within the autonomy of the 
municipalities, supervision also relates to the appropriateness of activities. There are no ways to dismiss 
an elected council (except for disciplinary matters) or to override local laws and decisions on political 
grounds without legal or constitutional backing. But cantonal authorities have to step in if a municipality 
goes bankrupt or is no longer able to elect municipal authorities (Ibid).   
Swiss municipalities enjoy far-reaching fiscal sovereignty, financing their activities through taxes, fees, 
and charges. They have the competence to fix the rate of the local tax on income and property. They are 
allowed to accumulate surpluses or debt and they prepare a budget which they have to submit to the 
local parliament, assembly, or directly to citizens in a referendum. Financial control is exercised first by 
municipal committees and then by the cantonal administration, which supervises the financial 
administration (Ibid). 
Issues and lessons 
Maintaining municipal autonomy. According to Ladner (2009), comparative studies indicate that Swiss 
citizens are quite satisfied not only with their local administrations and the services and facilities provided 
by local government, but also with the possibilities to influence local politics. However, in recent years, a 
greater number of government activities have been delegated to the municipalities, whilst the legal 
restrictions stemming from the federal and cantonal governments have intensified and become more 
complex. The result has been an increasing loss of autonomy by the municipalities (Ladner 2009). 
Since the 1990s there have been a number of attempts to reform local government. The entanglement of 
tasks and the flow of financial resources between the municipalities and the cantons have been 
considered non-transparent, ineffective, and inefficient. In almost all cantons, therefore, there have been 
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attempts to reform the way in which tasks and resources are allocated between the cantons and the 
municipalities (Ladner 2009). 
Facilitating cooperative federalism. In 2001 the three orders of government created the Tripartite 
Conference of Swiss Agglomerations to encourage policy coordination between the federal, cantonal, and 
municipal governments. Given the many shared responsibilities – such as transport, spatial planning, 
environment, social welfare, and healthcare and the strong impact federal policies have on metropolitan 
areas, this permanent forum is regarded in the literature as a sensible way of facilitating co-operative 
federalism (Ladner 2009). 
Politicians play an important role in linking the different orders of government. The typical career of a 
Swiss politician involves moving up the ladder from the municipal to the federal government, and a 
considerable number of politicians represent not only their political party but also their municipality or 
their canton. Having a member of a municipal executive who is at the same time a member of a cantonal 
parliament, or having a member of a cantonal government who is also a member in the federal 
Parliament, is one way to ensure the influence of the canton or municipality across the levels of 
government (Ibid).  
However, in recent years municipalities and local political parties have found it increasingly difficult to 
recruit enough qualified candidates. On the one hand, the fact that  a municipality has a parliament can 
make it easier for the parties to recruit candidates from among the members of the parliament to run for 
election to the local executive. On the other hand, the parties have to find enough candidates for their 
seats in the parliament in the first place. According to survey results, it is hardest to find enough 
candidates in medium-sized municipalities. By comparison, in the big cities public office is sufficiently 
prestigious and well-remunerated, while in the very small municipalities these offices are less time-
consuming, and it may be harder to refuse an invitation if it is evident that there is nobody else to do the 
job (Ibid). 
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